A Quality-Adjusted Price Index for Colorectal Cancer Drugs by Claudio Lucarelli & Sean Nicholson
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









Excellent research assistance was provided by Brigid Farrell and Artem Gulish. The Merck Foundation,
Pfizer, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, and AstraZeneca provided funding for the study. We thank IntrinsiQ,
Jeff Forringer, Robert Ruckman, Andrew Epstein, and Scott Johnson for providing and interpreting
the data, and Josh Bilenker and Brad Somer for information about oncology generally. Helpful comments
were also provided by Daniel Eisenberg, Will Manning, Alan Garber, Amitabh Chandra, and seminar
participants at Academy Health, the Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy Council, the Federal Trade
Commission, the University of Chicago, Duke University, the Missoula Tumor Board, and NBER.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Claudio Lucarelli and Sean Nicholson. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.A Quality-Adjusted Price Index for Colorectal Cancer Drugs
Claudio Lucarelli and Sean Nicholson




The average price of treating a colorectal cancer patient with chemotherapy increased from about $100
in 1993 to $36,000 in 2005, due largely to the approval and widespread use of five new drugs between
1996 and 2004. We examine whether the substantial increase in spending has been worth it. Using
discrete choice methods to estimate demand, we construct a price index for colorectal cancer drugs
for each quarter between 1993 and 2005 that takes into consideration the quality (i.e., the efficacy
and side effects in randomized clinical trials) of each drug on the market and the value that oncologists
place on drug quality. A naive price index, which makes no adjustments for the changing attributes
of drugs on the market, greatly overstates the true price increase. By contrast, a hedonic price index
and two quality-adjusted price indices show that prices have actually remained fairly constant over
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Medical technology, broadly deﬁned as the products and services patients receive
when treated, is the engine behind increases in medical spending. Newhouse
(1992) concludes that approximately two-thirds of the growth in medical costs in
the United States between 1950 and 1987 was due to changing medical technolo-
gies.1 There is also evidence that medical care in the US has improved substan-
tially over the past 30 years for certain health conditions such as cardiovascular
disease. For example, the life expectancy of a 45-year old today is 4.4 years longer
than it was in 1950 (Cutler (2004)).2 Murphy and Topel (2006) estimate that the
total rise in life expectancy in the US between 1970 and 2000 increased national
wealth by $3.2 trillion per year, which is approximately equal in value to one-half
of GDP.
An important policy issue, therefore, is whether the value of new medical tech-
nology exceeds its cost. More generally, if new technologies are priced higher than
the technologies they replace and consumers value the superior health outcomes
that can now be produced, are medical prices rising or falling once one correctly
accounts for quality? If the government and private health insurers believe new
medical technologies are causing quality-adjusted prices to increase, on average,
they may make it more diﬃcult for new products to reach the market and/or
reduce payment for new products, which would dampen the ﬁnancial incentives
1Newhouse estimates the proportion of the growth in medical spending accounted for by the aging of the
population, improved health insurance based upon the RAND health insurance experiment price elasticity,
and rising income based on the RAND income elasticity. Medical technology is the residual once the factors
above have been accounted for. Finkelstein (2007) argues that the aggregate, market-wide eﬀects of health
insurance on spending are larger than those derived from individual choices in the RAND experiment. She
estimates that about one-half of the growth in US hospital spending between 1950 and 1990 was due to the
spread of health insurance, which may indicate that medical technology accounts for less than one-half of the
growth in medical spending
2Cutler (2004) estimates that two-thirds of this increase was due to changing medical technologies, pri-
marily for the treatment of cardiovascular disease. The remaining one-third was due to behavioral changes.
2to innovate. Conversely, if public and private payers believe technology is help-
ing drive down quality-adjusted prices, they are likely to maintain or enhance
incentives to innovate.
Berndt et al. (2000) highlight several empirical challenges of measuring a medi-
cal price index. Due to health insurance, most consumers do not face the full price
of medical care and will seek to consume beyond the point where the marginal
value is equal to the full price. Patients also rely on physicians to provide in-
formation regarding the value of medical goods and services. The implication is
that consumer purchases in the medical market will not necessarily reveal their
marginal valuation of a good or service. Perhaps the greatest empirical challenge
for constructing meaningful price indexes in health care is how to account for the
changing quality of medical products and services.
Due to these considerable empirical challenges, there have been few studies
of whether medical prices are rising or falling once one takes into consideration
the attributes of the new products and consumers’ valuations of those attributes.
Cutler et al. (1998) show that the life expectancy of heart attack patients increased
by eight months between 1984 and 1991. The value of per-patient expected
longevity ($11,100) increased three times more than treatment costs ($3,600)
during this time period in real terms, which implies that the quality-adjusted
price index fell by about one percent annually. Berndt et al. (2002) conclude that
the real cost of treating major depression decreased by about two percent per
year between 1991 and 1996 once one takes into account the probability that a
patient’s depression goes into remission.
The pharmaceutical industry is the source of considerable innovation in medi-
cal care. The pharmaceutical industry invests over $40 billion per year in research
and development, which represents about 16 percent of the industry’s revenue.
Most new pharmaceuticals are priced higher than the treatment methods they
replace, and this has certainly been the case with colorectal cancer drugs. The
average price of providing a colorectal cancer patient with a 24-week chemother-
3apy drug regimen increased from $127 in 1993 to $36,300 in 2005. There has been
substantial innovation in the treatment of colorectal cancer patients over the last
decade.3 Five new drugs were approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for the treatment of colorectal cancer between 1996 and 2004, and these
drugs collectively had an 86 percent market share by the third quarter of 2005.4
We examine whether the substantial increase in spending associated with phar-
maceutical innovation in the treatment of colorectal cancer has been worth it.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate a price index for colorectal cancer drugs for each quarter
between 1993 and the ﬁrst half of 2005 that takes into consideration the quality
(i.e., the eﬃcacy and side eﬀects as reported in clinical trials) of each drug on the
market and the value that oncologists attach to drug quality.
We estimate a quality-adjusted price index using methods developed by Berry
(1994), Berry et al. (1995), Berry and Pakes (2007) and Nevo (2003). These tech-
niques have been used to estimate the welfare eﬀects of new automobiles (Petrin
(2002), computers (Pakes (2003), Song (2007), Song (2005)), and breakfast cereal
(Nevo (2003))), but few contributions apply them to medical markets. Trajten-
berg (1990) focused on the value of innovation on medical devices, speciﬁcally
CT scanners, and provided various price indices. Cleanthous (2004) and Conti
(2006) study the value of innovation for anti-depressants, however, neither of
them constructs a price index.
The ﬁrst step in constructing the price index is to estimate oncologists’ demand
for colon cancer regimens, which we argue is a function of the observed and
unobserved quality of each regimen, as well as the price a physician must pay
to acquire the regimen. An observation in this estimation is the market share
of each regimen for each quarter. The second step is to calculate the equivalent
variation (EV) between each adjacent pair of quarters. The EV between period
313.2 percent of drugs entering Phase 1 trials between 1998 and 2004 were targeting cancer according to
the PharmaProjects data base.
4Market share data are from IntrinsiQ.
4t − 1 and t is the change in spending required to achieve physicians’ utility in
period t relative to t − 1, taking into consideration that both the quality of the
drug regimens on the market and the prices of those regimens may have changed
between these two periods. Positive values imply that the value of the drugs is
increasing over time by more than their prices, whereas negative values imply the
opposite. The third step is to translate the EV into a quality-adjusted price index
by calculating the change in drug prices that is consistent with the welfare eﬀect
captured by the EV.
We generate four additional indices for purposes of comparison. First, we
estimate a “naive” price index that merely reports the mean price of colon can-
cer regimens in each quarter, relative to the ﬁrst quarter of 1993, without any
adjustments for regimen attributes. The naive index will be based on the price
physicians pay to acquire each regimen and the market share of each regimen.
Comparing the quality-adjusted price index to the naive index illustrates the
importance of accounting for the changing quality of pharmaceutical products.
Second, we report the incremental spending per incremental expected quality
adjusted life years (QALYs), where the reference regimen is the oldest one on
the market. This index does not depend on how much value oncologists place
on various drug attributes, and can be compared to estimates in the literature
on the value of a statistical life. Third, we estimate a hedonic price index by
regressing prices on product characteristics and quarter indicator variables. This
regression, which controls for changing product attributes by means of a reduced
form projection of markups on the characteristic space, is the traditional method
traditionally used to account for changing attributes and the introduction of new
goods. Finally, to assess the implication of the logit assumption, we estimate a
vertical model in the spirit of Bresnahan (1987).
The naive price index, which increased by 2600 percent between 1993 and
2005, greatly overestimates the price increase. The hedonic price index and the
quality-adjusted price indices show that prices have actually decreased slightly
5over the 13-year period we study. The hedonic and quality-adjusted price indices
are similar during the period without innovation, and both exhibit a decrease
when the ﬁrst branded product is introduced in the market. For the following
period of innovation the two indices show opposite trends, with the hedonic price
increasing and the quality-adjusted index decreasing. This discrepancy may be
due to the logit functional form assumption, which increases the dimensionality of
the problem, and makes all innovation welfare enhancing.In contrast, the vertical
model shows an increase in the prices due to innovation of about 28% over the
13-year period. This model is an extreme case, where there are no unobserved
shocks to preferences, and the physicians are heterogeneous due to permanent
components. The levels of the quality-adjusted logit, vertical and hedonic price
indices demonstrate that the pricing strategies of pharmaceutical ﬁrms allow them
to appropriate most of the extra welfare they generate from improved product
attributes. For all the models the indices remain fairly constant over the period
studied. All of the new drugs in our sample period are still under patent pro-
tection. Presumably consumers would capture more of the surplus once generic
drugs enter the market.
2 Overview of Colorectal Cancer
Colorectal cancer is a good health condition for studying the welfare eﬀects of
medical innovation because it is a common health condition, the majority of pa-
tients today are treated with drugs that did not exist a decade ago, and treatment
costs are rising rapidly. According to the National Cancer Institute, approxi-
mately 112,000 patients will be diagnosed with colorectal cancer in the United
States in 2007, and 52,000 will die from the disease. This places colorectal cancer
as the fourth most common cancer based on number of new patients, after breast,
prostate, and lung. It is estimated that people born today will have a 5.4 percent
chance of being diagnosed with colorectal cancer over their lifetime. The disease
6is treatable, however; between 1996 and 2003, colorectal cancer patients had a 64
percent chance of surviving for ﬁve years. The probability a patient will survive
for ﬁve years ranges from 93 percent for those diagnosed with Stage I cancer to
eight percent for those diagnosed with Stage IV cancer (NCCN).
Colorectal cancer patients usually begin treatment by having the tumor sur-
gically removed. Most stage 3 and about half of stage 4 patients then receive
chemotherapy treatment. For male Medicare patients diagnosed with colorectal
cancer between 1998 and 2002, total treatment costs in the ﬁrst year following
diagnosis averaged $29,600 (Yabroﬀ et al. (2008)). About 70 percent of these
costs were due to hospital care, primarily from the initial surgery. In this paper
we present an index for chemotherapy drug prices only, not for the total cost
of treating the disease. We focus on chemotherapy costs because this is where
the innovation has occurred since 1996, and is the likely driver of the increase in
treatment costs and improvements in health outcomes.5 Although chemotherapy
costs accounted for about 25 percent of total treatment costs for Medicare col-
orectal cancer patients in 2001, it may represent the largest cost segment after
the average chemotherapy cost per patient increased by $28,000 between 2001
and 2005.6
There are other important reasons we decided to study colorectal cancer treat-
ment. For most health conditions, if a physician writes a prescription for a drug,
the patient takes the prescription to a pharmacy, the patient pays a co-payment or
co-insurance rate, and the patient’s health insurance company pays the balance of
the price. By observing the price (co-payment) patients face and their decisions,
one could estimate patients’ demand for prescription drugs only for a portion of
the demand curve, which would make it impossible to estimate consumers’ total
5Total treatment costs for a Medicare colorectal cancer patient only increased by about $2,000 in real
terms between 1991 and 2001 during a period where most patients were receiving generic chemotherapy
drugs.
6The 25 percent ﬁgure was reported by Joan Warren in a presentation at the International Health Eco-
nomics meetings in July 2007.
7willingness to pay for a product.
Most oncology drugs are infused into a patient intravenously in a physician’s
oﬃce or an outpatient hospital clinic by a nurse under a physician’s supervision.7
Unlike drugs that are distributed through pharmacies, physicians (and some hos-
pitals on behalf of their physicians) purchase oncology drugs from wholesalers or
distributors (who have previously purchased the drugs from the manufacturers),
store the drugs, and administer them as needed to their patients. Physicians then
bill the patient’s insurance company for an administration fee and the cost of the
drug. Although physicians are eventually reimbursed by health insurers, they do
take temporary ownership of oncology drugs. As such, physicians face the pos-
sible risk of not being reimbursed by health insurers and may incur substantial
carrying costs. For example, a physician who pays $50,000 for the drugs in a
patient’s regimen and experiences a three-month delay between when he acquires
the drugs and when he is reimbursed by a health insurer would incur an inventory
carrying cost of $1,333 at an interest rate of eight percent. Because we observe
the full price that physicians pay for colorectal cancer drugs, we can estimate
physicians’ demand for those drugs. If physicians act as agents for their patients,
we indirectly observe patients’ willingness to pay for these drugs.
Almost all colorectal cancer patients who are treated with pharmaceuticals
receive multiple drugs in the form of a regimen rather than a single drug, simi-
lar to anti-retroviral “cocktail” treatments for AIDS patients. For example, the
regimen with the greatest market share in 2005 contained four separate drugs:
bevacizumab, oxaliplatin, ﬂuorororicil, and leucovorin. The 12 regimens in our
sample are reported in Table 1. Most of our analysis, therefore, is conducted at
the level of a regimen rather than a drug.
7Based on data from IMS Health, 59% of colorectal cancer drugs in the third quarter of 2005 were
purchased by physician oﬃces/clinics and 28% by hospitals. The remainder was purchased by retail and mail
order pharmacies, health maintenance organizations, and long-term care facilities.
83 Empirical Methods
To account for changes in quality of new goods we use a hedonic price regression
and the construction of two quality-adjusted price indices. The quality-adjusted
price indices are constructed from the estimated beneﬁts of innovation that were
derived from the estimation of a discrete choice model of demand for colon cancer
drugs under two extreme assumptions. The technical details of each approach are
described in this section.
3.1 Hedonic Price Regression
Hedonic price regressions were introduced by Court (1939) and formalized by
Griliches (1961) as a way to account for the new goods problem. In essence,
newer goods usually contain more desirable characteristics, and therefore, failing
to account for the value of these characteristics will overestate the true change
in prices. The hedonic price regression is motivated by the “hedonic hypothe-
sis,” which states that goods can be viewed as aggregations or bundles of lower
order variables that the literature calls characteristics or attributes. These char-
acteristics are the variables that consumers care about and that are present in
their utility functions. The hedonic function provides a dissaggregation of the
observed transaction prices into the variables that aﬀect the economic agents’
behavior. Court and Griliches proposed estimating a surface that relates prices
to product characteristics and time, and then use the results to obtain estimates
of the price changes keeping the characteristics constant.
For our application, we estimate the following hedonic price regression
lnpit = βxit +
05:3 
t=93:2
γtdt + εit (1)
where pit is the price of regimen i in quarter t, xit contains the attributes
of each regimen, including eﬀectiveness attributes such as survival rate, time-to-
progression, and response rate, a second line treatment indicator, the interactions
9between the eﬀectiveness attributes above and the second line indicator, grade 3 or
4 side eﬀects such as diarrhea, nausea, abdominal pain, vomiting and neutropenia,
and an indicator of whether the regiment contains a tablet or not. The time
dummies denote quarters and the base quarter is the ﬁrst quarter of 1993.
The change in prices is obtained from the parameters of the time dummies as
PI t − PI t−1
PI t−1
=e x p ( γt − γt−1) − 1
and therefore,
PI t =e x p ( γt − γt−1)PI t−1
The parameters β in equation (1) have been referred to as “implicit prices”,
however, the theoretical foundations of the hedonic surface are not clear. Pakes
(2005) argues that in oligopolistic markets, price is a combination of marginal
costs and markups, and therefore the hedonic price regression constitutes a re-
duced form or projection of these markups on the characteristic space. In the in-
dustry we study, given the high costs of R&D relative to marginal cost, markups
should be large and Pakes’s insights are applicable. The parameters β do not nec-
essarily follow any restriction based on economic theory. That is, the β parameters
may have the “wrong” sign. For example, if there is more entry of products into
a particular region of the attribute space that has more desirable characteristics
for the average consumer (e.g., survival), this will reduce the markups of these
products, and allow the product with less desirable characteristics for the average
consumer (e.g., worse side eﬀects) to exploit monopoly power among the con-
sumers who do not experience the strong side eﬀects. The results of the hedonic
price regression are discussed in the results section of the paper.
3.2 Quality-Adjusted Price Index
We compute a second set of price indices that explicitly calculate the changes in
welfare from the introduction of new products. These indices are derived from
10the estimation of an equilibrium model of colon cancer drug pricing. Trajtenberg
(1990), who introduced the idea, proposed a two-stage method to construct a
quality-adjusted price index. In the ﬁrst stage, the welfare gains from product
innovation are obtained, and in the second stage the price index is built upon
those welfare gains.
In this paper the ﬁrst step is performed by estimating a logit model, where
the preferences of the physician i over regimens j ∈{ 0,...,J t} at time t are
represented by the following indirect utility function
uijt = −αpjt + βxjt + ξj +Δ ξj + εijt
where pjt is the price of regimen j at time t, xjt are the observable attributes
of the regimen, ξj is the mean of the unobserved characteristics, andΔ ξjt is a
time-speciﬁc deviation from this mean. εijt, which is an idiosyncratic shock to
preferences for regimen j, is assumed to follow a Type I Extreme Value distri-
bution.8 The outside option (j = 0) in this paper includes oﬀ-label colon cancer
treatments and regimens with very small market shares for which a complete set
of is not observed.
Patients are assumed to be administered one regimen at a given time, which
maximizes their utility. This implicitly deﬁnes a region of the unobserved term
for which alternative j yields a higher utility than any other alternative k
Ajt = {εit|uijt ≥ uikt∀k  = j}
The market shares for each regimen j can be obtained by aggregating the
individual preferences over the region Ajt
8In this model all the individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity is contained in the idiosyncratic shock to pref-
erences, and therefore, it suﬀers from the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives criticism (see
Nevo (2000) for a complete discussion of the limitations of this approach). In addition, Petrin (2002) points
out that the welfare calculations based on these models depend heavily on the error term. We are cur-
rently estimating more ﬂexible speciﬁcations such as the ones proposed by Berry et al. (1995), and the pure





If ε is assumed to be drawn from the extreme value distribution, the integral
can be computed analytically:
σjt =
exp(−αpjt + βxjt + ξj +Δ ξj)
1+
Jt
k=1 exp(−αpkt + βxkt + ξk +Δ ξk)
We deﬁne the mean utility level δjt = −αpjt + βxjt+ ξj +Δ ξj, and therefore,
the market shares can be written as the function σjt(δt), with δt being the vector
of mean utilities at time t.
The market shares predicted by the model σjt(δt) are then matched with the
observed market shares sjt. Berry (1994) shows that δj can be uniquely identiﬁed
by inverting the market share function σ−1(st)=δt. For the logit model, the
inversion yields
lnsjt − lns0t = −αpjt + βxjt + ξj +Δ ξj
Because the unobserved drug regimen characteristics are likely to be correlated
with price, the estimation of the equation above requires the use of instrumental
variables. We obtain our instruments by using the supply side market equilibrium
conditions. Because price is a function of marginal cost and markups, any exoge-
nous variable that shifts marginal costs or markups should be a valid instrument.
We follow Bresnahan et al. (1997) and use the number of products in the market
and the sum of observed characteristics of the competitors (which the literature
assumes as exogenous and provides a sense of how crowded is the product space)
as our instruments. Both sets of instruments will shift markups through changes
in the competitive environment, and therefore, will be correlated with price, but
uncorrelated with the unobserved characteristics.
One concern with this model is that if physicians earn proﬁts on chemotherapy
drugs, proﬁts are correlated with the observed price and/or the attributes, and
12proﬁts inﬂuence physicians prescribing decisions, then the α and β coeﬃcients
may be biased. In a 2001 study, the federal government concluded that oncolo-
gists could earn proﬁts on most chemotherapy drugs by acquiring them for less
than the Medicare reimbursement amount (GAO (2001)). This occurred because
Medicare reimbursed oncologists 95 percent of a drugs listed average wholesale
price (AWP), whereas physicians could usually acquire drugs from wholesalers for
less than the AWP. For example, physicians were acquiring irinotecan in 2001 for
23 percent less than AWP, on average, which allowed them to earn an approxi-
mate 18 percent proﬁt (GAO (2001)).9. Most of these proﬁts were eliminated in
2005 when Medicare started reimbursing oncologists based on the actual average
selling price (ASP) of a drug rather than the list price (MedPAC (2006)). In the
ﬁrst quarter of 2005, for example, oncologists were acquiring three branded col-
orectal cancer drugs (bevacizumab, irinotecan, and oxaliplatin) for two or three
percent less than the new Medicare reimbursement amount, on average. Jacob-
son et al. (2006) exploit exogenous variation between oncologists in the generosity
of Medicare reimbursement for chemotherapy drugs to estimate the inﬂuence of
physician proﬁts on treatment decisions. Although they ﬁnd that oncologists who
were reimbursed relatively generously did prescribe more expensive chemotherapy
drugs, the magnitude of the eﬀect is small: a one-standard deviation increase in
reimbursement generosity is associated with an increase of about ﬁve percent in
the cost of chemotherapy prescribed to colorectal cancer patients.
We estimate our models with and without the data from 2005 to see if the
results are sensitive to a change in the reimbursement regime. We also present
results of an index that uses estimates from the literature for the value of a
year of life, or of a quality adjusted life year (QALY), rather than physicians
valuations of drug attributes. The price index is built based on the changes in
compensating variation derived from the estimation of the model described above.
9Many oncologists argued that proﬁts on the acquisition of chemotherapy drugs oﬀset Medicares low fees
to physicians for administering the drugs
13The compensating variation provides a measure of how much income could be
taken away from (or given to) an individual and leave him indiﬀerent between
facing the old choice set and the new improved (inferior) choice set. Given the




where ut is the unconditional indirect utility ut =m a x j ujt and α is the






Trajtenberg (1990) shows that if the price change takes the form of a shift by
af a c t o ro f( 1−μt) in the distribution of prices but the variance remains the same,
then the price index can be obtained as





and ¯ pt is the average price in period t.
3.3 Vertical Model
Suppose now that the indirect utility of physician/consumer i when he chooses
product j in market t is represented by:
uijt = −αipjt + βxjt + ξj +Δ ξj
Notice that in this model there is a diﬀerent α for each consumer i and there is no
unobserved shock to preferences. This model is the opposite case of the previous
logit model, where all the heterogeneity entered through the error term, while
in this model the heterogeneity is present in the random coeﬃcient for price,
14which is a permanent component. This one-random-coeﬃcient model assumes
that consumers agree on the ranking of product quality, and that they only diﬀer
on their willingness to pay for it.10 In this model there is also an outside option
whose utility is normalized to zero. This model, as opposed to the logit one, could
potentially predict zero market share for a product.
Ordering products by ascending price, a consumer will buy product j iﬀ uij >
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Assuming Δ0(δ,p)=∞ andΔ J(δ,p) = 0, we can write the market share for
product j as:
sj(δ,p;Ω,F)=( F(Δj(δ,p)|θ)−F(Δj(δ,p)|θ))I{Δj > Δj} for j =0 ,...,J
where I{} is an indicator function, Ω are the parameters, and F(αi|θ) corresponds
to the c.d.f. of αi, which is assumed to be log-normal.
























|θ), for 1 <j<J
10Ongoing work extends this model to include more than one random coeﬃcient, and therefore the product





The market share of a product is therefore determined by its price-adjusted
quality distance from its neighboring products.
The market share equations are inverted recursively to obtain the estimated





If p0 and δ0 are assumed to be 0, then with data on prices and market share,




δjt = δj−1,t +( pjt − pj−1,t)F
−1(1 − s0t − s1t −···− sj−1,t|θ)
In the estimation stage of this model we estimate all the parameters Ω=
(α,β,θ) by means of a GMM procedure where we exploit the moment conditions
of the kind E(Z Δξ(Ω)) = 0, where Z contains functions of observable attributes
uncorrelated withΔ ξ(Ω)
The price index is computed in a similar way to the previous quality-adjusted
price index, with the diﬀerence that the unconditional indirect utility is com-
puted by simulating 1000 physicians drawing from the distribution of αi,a n d
then obtaining CV t as an average of the individuals’ compensating variations.
4D a t a
We use a number of diﬀerent data sources to collect four types of information:
drug prices, regimen market shares, typical drug dosage amounts for each regimen,
and regimen attributes. IMS Health collects information on the sales in dollars
and the quantity of drugs purchased by 10 diﬀerent types of customers (e.g.,
hospitals, physician oﬃces, retail pharmacies) from wholesalers in each quarter
from 1993 through the third quarter of 2005. Prices and quantities are reported
16separately by National Drug Classiﬁcation (NDC) code, which are unique for each
ﬁrm-product-strength/dosage-package size. We calculate the average price paid
per milligram of active ingredient of a drug by averaging across the diﬀerent NDC
codes for that drug. IMS Health reports the invoice price a customer actually
pays to a wholesaler, not the average wholesale price (AWP), which often diﬀers
substantially from the true transaction price. We use nominal rather than real
prices because any deﬂator would itself be a price index, and we do not want to
build one index on top of another. The price we calculate does not include any
discounts or rebates a customer may receive from a manufacturer after purchasing
the product from the wholesaler. Based on interviews with a few oncologists, we
do not believe that manufacturers oﬀered substantial rebates during this period.
Although we have information on 10 diﬀerent types of customers, we focus on the
prices paid by the two largest customers - hospitals and physician oﬃces. Because
most oncology drugs are infused in a physician’s oﬃce or hospital clinic, nursing
homes and retail pharmacies purchase relatively little.
Most colon cancer patients are treated with regimens that combine two or
more drugs. The IMS Health data contain information on market share by drug,
but not market share for the combinations of drugs (regimens) actually used on
patients. We rely, therefore, on two diﬀerent sources for regimen-speciﬁc market
shares. IntrinsiQ is a company that provides information systems to oncologists to
help them determine the proper chemotherapy dosing for their cancer patients. As
a result, IntrinsiQ collects monthly data from its oncology clients on the types of
chemotherapy drugs used for patients. IntrinsiQ provided data on the proportion
of colorectal cancer patients (of all ages) treated with chemotherapy who are
treated with each regimen for each month between January 2002 and September
2005.11
11Because we observe the market shares of regimens among patients with colorectal cancer, we do not need
to worry about oﬀ-label use. Oﬀ-label use occurs when a physician treats a colorectal cancer patient with
a drug that has not been approved by the FDA to treat colorectal cancer, or when a physician uses a drug
17We derive market shares for the 1993 to 2001 period from the Surveillance
Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) data set, which tracks the health and
treatment of cancer patients over the age of 64 in states and cities covering 26
percent of the United States population.12 We calculate the proportion of colorec-
tal cancer patients who are treated with each drug regimen in each quarter based
on Medicare claims data available in SEER. In October 2003, approximately 48
percent of all colorectal cancer patients treated with chemotherapy were 65 years
or older.13
In the 1993 to 2001 period, when there were relatively few treatment options
for colorectal cancer, we include all regimens that contain drugs that were explic-
itly approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for colorectal cancer
and had a market share greater than two percent. Market shares of all other
drugs are combined into an outside option, which in this early period will consist
primarily of oﬀ-label drugs - drugs approved for conditions other than colorectal
cancer that are used on colorectal cancer patients.14 In the 2002 to 2005 period,
the outside option includes oﬀ-label drugs, regimens with less than one percent
market share in the third quarter of 2005 (the end of the sample period), and
regimens with missing attribute data.
Market shares for the 12 regimens in our sample and the outside option are
plotted in Figure 1. The regimens are also described more fully in Table 1, ar-
ranged in order of entry separately for ﬁrst- and second-line therapies. Between
1993 and 1996, about 95 percent of colorectal cancer patients were treated with 5-
approved for colorectal cancer on a patient with a diﬀerent type of cancer. In October 2005, seventy-six
percent of patients being treated with the four drugs approved solely for the treatment of colorectal cancer
(irinotecan, oxaliplatin, cetuximab, and bevacizumab) actually had colorectal cancer. That is, oﬀ-label use
accounted for approximately 24 percent of the quantities of these drugs.
12SEER contains data on the incidence rate of cancer among the non-elderly, but only has medical claims
available for Medicare patients.
13Data from IntrinsiQ.
14Oﬀ-label use is more likely to occur if a patient’s initial treatment has been unsuccessful.
18FU/leucovorin, which at that time was generic, with the remainder treated with
oﬀ-label drugs or regimens with very small market share.15 Irinotecan (brand
name Camptosar) was approved by the FDA for treating colorectal cancer in
1996, and over the next several years the market share of irinotecan (approved as
a second-line treatment for metastatic colorectal cancer patients who had already
been treated with a diﬀerent chemotherapy regimen) and irinotecan combined
with 5-FU/LV grew at the expense of 5-FU/LV.16 Capecitabine (Xeloda), a tablet
that produces the same chemical response as 5-FU/LV, was approved for treat-
ment of colorectal cancer in April of 2001 and was administered as a standalone
therapy or combined with irinotecan. All other drugs for treating colorectal can-
cer in our sample are delivered intravenously under the supervision of a physician
or nurse.
Oxaliplatin (Eloxatin) was introduced in August of 2002, followed by cetux-
imab (Erbitux) and bevacizumab (Avastin) in February of 2004. By the third
quarter of 2005, two of the regimens created by these three new drugs (oxali-
platin + 5-FU/LV; and bevacizumab + oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV) surpassed the
market share of 5-FU/LV, whose share had fallen to about 14 percent.
The market shares of several regimens change sharply in the ﬁrst quarter of
2002 when we use market share data from IntrinsiQ rather than SEER. One
explanation for these changes is that Medicare patients may be treated with
diﬀerent regimens than non-Medicare patients. Another possible explanation is
that the samples used by IntrinsiQ and/or SEER may not be consistent.17In
order to smooth market shares between the pre- and post-2002 periods, we apply
a regimen-speciﬁc factor to adjust the pre-2002 market shares based on the ratio
of total (from IntrinsiQ) to Medicare-only (from SEER) market shares for the
four quarters of 2002, when the two data sets overlap.
155-FU contains the drug ﬂuorororacil.
16Because it takes Medicare a while to code new drugs into their proper NDC code, for several quarters a
new drug will appear in the outside option.
17The SEER sample is drawn from locations representing 26 percent of the U.S. population.
19In order to calculate the price per regimen, we require information on the
quantity of each drug in a regimen. The National Comprehensive Cancer Network
(NCCN) reports the typical amount of active ingredient used by physicians for the
major regimens. We supplement this where necessary with dosage information
from drug package inserts, conference abstracts, and journal articles. Dosage
information is reported in Appendix 1. For example, the standard dosage schedule
for the regimen with the second largest market share in 2005 is 85 milligrams (mg)
of oxaliplatin per meter squared of a patient’s surface area infused by IV on the
ﬁrst day of treatment, followed by a 1,000 mg infusion of 5-FU per meter squared
of surface area on the ﬁrst and second treatment days, and a 200 mg infusion of
leucovorin per meter squared on the ﬁrst and second treatment days. This process
is repeated every two weeks. We price the regimens for a representative patient
who has 1.7 meters squared of surface area (Jacobson et al., 2006) weighs 80
kilograms, and is treated for 24 weeks. Regimen prices are derived by multiplying
the average price a customer paid per milligram of active ingredient in a quarter
by the recommended dosage amounts for each drug in the regimen over a 24-week
period.18
We obtain most of the attribute information for each regimen from the FDA-
approved package inserts that accompany each drug. These inserts describe the
phase 3 clinical trials that were conducted, including the number and types of
patients enrolled in the trials, the health outcomes for patients in the treatment
and control groups, and the side eﬀects experienced by those patients. Often there
are multiple observations for a regimen, either because a manufacturer conducted
separate trials of the same regimen, or because a regimen may have been the
treatment group in one clinical trial and the control group in a subsequent trial
run by a diﬀerent ﬁrm. In these cases we calculate the mean attributes across
the separate observations. Where necessary, we supplement the package insert
information with abstracts presented at oncology conferences and journal articles.
18The regimens are priced using data for the contemporaneous quarter only.
20The attribute information is summarized in Table 1, organized according to
the year when each regimen was introduced. We record three measures of a
regimen’s eﬃcacy: the median number of months patients survive after initiating
therapy; the percentage of patients who experience a complete or partial reduction
in the size of their tumor (i.e., the response rate); and the mean number of
months (across patients in the trial) before their cancer advanced to a more
serious state.19 For all three of these measures, higher values are associated
with superior health outcomes. We also record whether a regimen contains the
capecitabine tablet, which should make the administration of the regimen more
convenient for a patient, and whether the regimen is approved (and was tested) as
a second-line treatment. Eﬃcacy measures for second-line regimens will generally
be worse than those for ﬁrst-line regimens because the patients’ cancer is likely
to be more advanced at the beginning of the clinical trial and the ﬁrst treatment
was not completely successful.
We also collected data on the percentage of patients in phase 3 trials who
experienced either a grade 3 or a grade 4 side eﬀect for ﬁve separate conditions:
abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, and neutropenia. Although many
more side eﬀects are recorded for most regimens, these ﬁve were consistently
recorded across the 12 regimens in the sample. Side eﬀects are classiﬁed on a
standard one to four scale, with four being the most severe. Higher values for the
side eﬀect attributes should be associated with worse health outcomes although,
as we will show later, regimens that are more toxic are likely to be both more
eﬀective and have more severe side eﬀects.
New colorectal cancer regimens tend to be more eﬃcacious than the existing
regimens, with side eﬀect proﬁles that are sometimes more and sometimes less
severe than earlier regimens. Consider the new entrant in 1996, irinotecan +
5-FU/LV (second row of Table 1). Relative to patients who received 5-FU/LV
19Cancers are classiﬁed into four stages, with higher numbers indicating that the cancer has metastasized
beyond its initial location.
21in a clinical trial (ﬁrst row of Table 1), patients in clinical trials who received
irinotecan + 5-FU/LV lived 3.1 months longer, on average, had a 14.6 percentage
point higher probability of experiencing a reduction in the size of their tumor, and
experienced a two month delay in the time it took for the cancer to advance to a
more severe state. However, patients taking the new regimen were more likely to
experience four of the ﬁve side eﬀects listed in Table 1.
Oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV, which was launched in 2002 (ﬁfth row of Table 1),
is more eﬃcacious and has fewer severe side eﬀects than irinotecan + 5-FU/LV.
Patients in clinical trials of the former regimen lived an average of 3.8 months
longer, had a 10.7 percentage point higher probability of experiencing a reduction
in the size of their tumor, and experienced a 2.4 month delay in the time it took
for the cancer to advance to a more severe stage relative to the latter regimen.
Oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV patients are also less likely to experience a grade 3 or 4
side eﬀect for four of the ﬁve measures relative to irinotecan + 5-FU/LV. Finally,
the arrival of bevacizumab + oxaliplatin + 5-FU in 2004 increased the median
survival time by about four months relative to oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV, with sub-
stantial improvements with one side eﬀect measure and worse performance on the
other four measures.
Two new second-line regimens entered the market in 2004 to compete against
the ﬁrst second-line regimen (irinotecan) that was launched in 1996.20 Cetuximab
+ irinotecan has a substantially better response rate than irinotecan administered
by itself, although median survival is shorter. The new regimen also is superior
than irinotecan on all ﬁve of the side eﬀect measures.
20Regimens that include the tablet, capecitabine, are chemically equivalent to regimens that include 5-
FU/LV.
225R e s u l t s
In Figure 2 we plot the mean regimen price by quarter by multiplying the market
share of each regimen by the price physicians paid for that regimen. Since we
do not observe prices for the outside option, regimen market shares are rescaled
to equal one once the outside option is omitted. The price to physicians of a
24-week 5-FU/LV regimen in the ﬁrst quarter of 1993 was $127. The mean price
of colorectal cancer drugs increased to $597 in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 when two
new irinotecan-based regimens ﬁrst appeared in the SEER data set.21 In the ﬁrst
quarter of 1998, physicians paid $16,806 for a 24-week regimen of irinotecan and
$15,944 for a 24-week regimen of irinotecan + 5-FU/LV. Mean prices rose sharply
between 1998 and 2001 as the market share of the irinotecan-based regimens
increased and capecitabine was launched (see Figure 1). Most of the increase
was due to patients being shifted to the irinotecan-based regimens (see Figure 1)
rather than increases in the prices of the new regimens once they were launched.
The mean regimen price increased by 848 percent between the ﬁrst quarter of
1998 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2001, whereas the prices of the two irinotecan-based
regimens increased by 24 percent and 22 percent during the same time period.
The mean regimen price increased from $8,503 in the third quarter of 2002
to $12,664 in the third quarter of 2003 (a 49 percent increase), to $26,811 in the
third quarter of 2004 (a 112 percent increase from 2003), and ﬁnally to $36,291
in the third quarter of 2005 (a 35 percent increase from 2004). The prices of the
three regimens with the largest market shares in the third quarter of 2005 were
bevacizumab + oxaliplatin + 5-FU (price of $76,636 and 18.9 percent market
share), oxaliplatin + 5-FU/LV (price of $25,400 and 17.8 percent market share),
and 5-FU/LV (price of $75 and 13.6 percent market share).
To derive a naive price index that does not account for the changing attributes
21Irinotecan began generating sales in the IMS Health data set in the second quarter of 1996. However,
Medicare claims recorded irinotecan in an ”other” category until the ﬁrst quarter of 1998.
23of the regimens, one would divide the mean prices in Figure 2 by $127, the mean
price in the ﬁrst quarter of 1993. The shape of the naive index is identical to that
of Figure 2, with the only diﬀerence that it is indexed to one in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1993 and reaches 286 in the third quarter of 2005. That is, prices increased by
28,600 percent between the ﬁrst quarter of 1993 and the third quarter of 2005.
We next present a price index that does not rely on estimates of how much
value physicians place on a drugs eﬃcacy and side eﬀects. In the ﬁrst four columns
of Table 2 we report the year each ﬁrst-line metastatic regimen was approved, its
average price in 2005, the median number of months patients survived when
taking the regimen in clinical trials, and a patients expected number of quality
adjusted life years (QALYs) based on the performance of the drug in clinical
trials. The expected QALY of a drug depends on the amount of time a patient
expects to spend in ﬁve diﬀerent health states (i.e., stable metastatic disease with
or without side eﬀects; a chemotherapy drug is causing the tumor to shrink with
or without side eﬀects; and disease has progressed to a more advanced state)
and the utility weight associated with each health state.22 The utilities weights
for each health state, which we average across three studies (Brown and Hutton
(1998); Brown et al. (2001); Lloyd et al. (2006)), are 0.68 for stable metastatic
disease without a side eﬀect, 0.55 for stable disease with one of six common side
eﬀects, 0.82 if the tumor is responding to chemotherapy and the patient is not
experiencing a side eﬀect, 0.69 if the tumor is responding but the patient has a
side eﬀect, 0.42 if the disease progresses to a more advanced state, and zero for
death.23
In the ﬁnal three columns of Table 2 we report the incremental cost of each
drug relative to 5-FU, the incremental cost per incremental expected life year
22We assume that a patients treatment ceases once the disease advances, so patients no longer experience
side eﬀects in that state.
23Lloyd et al. (2006) derive utility weights by presenting 100 healthy individuals with a set of standard
gambles; Brown and Hutton (1998) and Brown et al. (2001) derive the weights by presenting standard gambles
to oncology nurses. A person in perfect health would have a utility weight of one.
24(relative to 5-FU), and the incremental cost per incremental expected QALY
(relative to 5-FU). Most of the drugs have an incremental cost per incremental
expected life year between $50,000 and $100,000. The exception, capecitabine,
produces the same chemical response as 5-FU but is more convenient because
capecitabine can be ingested whereas 5-FU must be infused in a physicians oﬃce.
Although there is no consensus among economists, most empirical studies assign
a value of $75,000 to $150,000 per life year (Cutler (2004)), and a recent paper
placed the value at $373,000 for a 50-year old male (Murphy and Topel (2006)).
Most of the drugs have an incremental cost per incremental expected QALY
between $100,000 and $150,000.
In Figure 3 we plot the mean incremental (relative to 5-FU) cost per incremen-
tal (relative to 5-FU) expected life year and expected QALY for patients taking a
ﬁrst-line metastatic regimen other than 5-FU between 1998 and 2005. Speciﬁcally,
for all ﬁrst-line regimens other than 5-FU on the market in a particular quarter,
we take a weighted average of the cost and expected health outcome, where the
weights are the regimen market shares in that quarter. 24 When irinotecan is
launched the incremental cost per incremental expected life year is $60,000. This
value rises 43 percent by 2002 due to the increasing price of irinotecan and the
launch of capecitabine in 2001. The incremental cost then falls with the intro-
duction of oxaliplatin- and bevacizumab-based regimens and is 20 percent higher
in the third quarter of 2005 than the ﬁrst quarter of 1998. By comparison, the
consumer price index increased by 19.8 percent during this time period.
The mean incremental cost per incremental QALY displays a similar pattern,
with a slightly higher peak in 2002. Recall that we use nominal rather than
real prices when constructing the indices to avoid building one index on top of
another. As a point of reference, however, the consumer price index increased
by 35.2 percent between 1993 and 2005. Coeﬃcient estimates from the hedonic
regression are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the
24Because we omit 5-FU and the second-line regimens, the weights sum to one in each quarter.
25price a customer paid for regimen j in quarter t. Regimen attributes are included
as well as a full set of quarter indicator variables. We also interact the second
line therapy indicator with a regimen’s response rate.25
The coeﬃcients on two of the three eﬃcacy measures are positive and signiﬁ-
cant. An increase of one month in the median patient survival is associated with
a 64.2 percent increase in the price of a regimen.26 Evaluated at the mean regi-
men price in the sample ($21,113), this implies an increase of $13,555. Physicians
are implicitly valuing an expected year of life saved at $162,700. Regimens with
relatively high response rates are also priced higher, with the eﬀect smaller for
second-line therapies.
The coeﬃcient on time to progression is negative, which seems to indicate that
physicians assign a negative valuation to that attribute. Pakes (2005) shows that
coeﬃcients in hedonic regressions will not necessarily have their expected signs.
His insight is that the degree of competition will diﬀer across the attribute space.
In the situation of colorectal cancer, for example, there may be greater diﬀerenti-
ation and less competition with the survival and response rate attributes relative
to time to progression. Pharmaceutical and biotech ﬁrms design their products
and construct the clinical trials that will deﬁne the attributes years before the
products are approved and marketed. It is quite plausible, therefore, that at any
given point in time there could more diﬀerentiation on certain attributes than
others.
Two of the side eﬀect attributes have negative coeﬃcients and three have
positive coeﬃcients in Table 3. Cancer patients often take drugs that ameliorate
the impact of certain side eﬀects, such as pain, nausea, and vomiting. In addition
to the explanation above, this may be another reason why physicians seem to
assign a positive value to the abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting side eﬀects.
If a physician prescribes anti-pain and antiemetic drugs in conjunction with the
25We did not include other second-line attribute interactions due to multi-colinearity.
260.642 = exp(0.496) - 1.
26anti-cancer drugs, she may downgrade the importance of these side eﬀects when
choosing a regimen. A third possible explanation for the positive coeﬃcients on
three of the side eﬀect attributes is that physicians may believe that the eﬃcacy
of the newer drugs are better than the measures reported in phase 3 clinical trials.
This could occur, for example, if physicians use the drugs diﬀerently in practice
than as they were used in the trials due to learning about patient-drug matching.
Because the newer drugs are more toxic and generally have greater side eﬀects,
the physician beliefs would be captured as positive coeﬃcients on the side eﬀect
measures.
The very large positive coeﬃcient on the second-line indicator variable con-
ﬁrms that these therapies are priced much higher than ﬁrst-line therapies, con-
trolling for the attributes of each. This implies there is a much higher willingness
to pay for an extra life year for the very sick relative to the less sick. Finally, reg-
imens containing the capecitabine tablet are priced slightly lower than regimens
that use 5-FU/LV instead. This does not necessarily imply that physicians do
not value the convenience associated with the tablet but also less dosage of other
drugs. As indicated in Appendix 1, the dosages of certain branded drugs (e.g.,
irinotecan) are lower when capecitabine is used instead of 5-FU/LV.
We exponentiate the coeﬃcients on the quarter indicator variables (the ﬁrst
quarter of 1993 is omitted) and plot the hedonic price index in Figure 4. The
pattern of prices for the hedonic index (the lower line) in Figure 4 is dramatically
diﬀerent from Figure 2, which emphasizes the importance of controlling for prod-
uct attributes. Prices were stable in nominal terms between 1993 and the second
quarter of 1996 when the only regimen approved for colorectal cancer treatment
was 5-FU/LV and the components of this regimen were no longer patent pro-
tected. The hedonic index drops by about 25 points with the introduction of the
two irinotecan-based therapies, which were priced at about $16,000. Controlling
for the attributes of these new regimens and physicians’ valuations of those at-
tributes, prices fell by about 25 percent. Over the next six years, including the
27period when capecitabine was introduced, the index increased from 0.71 to 0.85.
The price index jumped by six points with the introduction of the oxaliplatin-
based regimens in 2002, and has remained fairly constant since then during the
time when cetuximab and bevacizumab were launched.
In the same ﬁgure we show the quality-adjusted price index. The quality-
adjusted index is very similar to the hedonic price index during the period where
only 5-FU/LV was present. There is a decrease of 28 points during 1998, when
irinotecan started showing positive market shares.27 That decrease after the intro-
duction of irinotecan was also present in the hedonic price index in 1996. During
the period 1999 to 2001, the quality-adjusted price index slowly increases as does
the hedonic price index, but in 2002 when oxaliplatin is introduced their pre-
dictions diﬀer. The quality-adjusted index exhibits a decrease after oxaliplatin
is introduced, which may provide evidence that the hedonic price index is not
able to capture the extending the range or ﬁlling the spectrum type of innova-
tion that occurred during this period. The 8-percentage point decrease in the
quality-adjusted price index after the introduction of oxaliplatin contrasts with
the 6 percentage points increase in the hedonic price index. Finally, the quality-
adjusted price index remains decreasing towards the end of our period of analysis.
Contrasting with the previous two models, the vertical model shows that innova-
tion results in moderate, but positive price increases. The parameter estimates
for this model are shown in Table 5, and the distribution of the random coeﬃcient
on price is presented in Figure 5.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence to support the idea that new medical technology,
in particular colon cancer drugs, provide welfare increases that justify their cost.
27Although irinotecan was introduced in 1996, the SEER data set only shows positive market shares for
this drug in 1998.
28We calculate a naive price index that does not adjust for improving attributes
and compare it with a hedonic price index and two quality-adjusted price indices.
The conclusions about the evolution of prices of new pharmaceutical developments
diﬀers substantially between the naive price index and the three methods that
take into account changing product attributes. While the naive price index shows
a dramatic increase in prices over the 13-year period we study, the hedonic price
and the quality-adjusted price index show slight decreases, and slight increase in
the case of the vertical model. The levels of the hedonic and quality-adjusted
price indices suggest that pharmaceutical companies are able to capture most
of the welfare they generate with the launches of new and better products.28
Ongoing research will reﬁne these estimates using frontier discrete choice methods
for demand estimation.
28Pharmaceutical and biotech ﬁrms may in turn transfer some of the welfare gains to physicians by oﬀering
rebates when they purchase a suﬃciently large quantity of a companys chemotherapy drugs.
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Coefficient Estimates from Hedonic Regression
Coefficient       Standard Error
Efficacy measures:
   General survival (months)  0.113** 0.004
   General survival * second line indicator -1.478** 0.011
   Response rate (percentage)  0.336** 0.002
   Response rate * second line indicator  0.510** 0.003
   Time to progression (months) -1.013** 0.015
Grade 3 or 4 side effects:
Diarrhea  0.061** 0.001
   Nausea  0.201** 0.001
   Abdominal pain  0.935** 0.005
   Neutropenia -0.001 0.001
Tablet -0.122** 0.009
Physician clinics   0.010 0.009
   (hospitals omitted)
Constant -5.546** 0.081
Observations        492
R
2        0.99
Notes: the unit of observation is the logarithm of the mean price a type of customer (physician 
clinics or hospitals) pays for a regimen in a quarter.  The regressions include a full set of quarter 
indicator variables.  The interaction between general survival and the second line therapy 
indicator, and time to progression and the second line therapy indicator are dropped due to 
colinearity.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level.Table 4
Coefficient       Standard Error
Price -0.866** 0.127
Efficacy measures:
   General survival (months)  0.102 0.075
   Response rate (percentage)  0.349** 0.073
   Response rate * second line therapy -0.025 0.022
   Time to progression (months) -1.374** 0.216
Grade 3 or 4 side effects:
Diarrhea  0.030 0.017
   Nausea  0.025 0.019
   Abdominal pain  0.240** 0.072
   Neutropenia -0.066** 0.011
Tablet -1.955** 0.232
Constant   5.981** 0.529
Observations        208
R
2        0.89
Notes: the dependent variable is the logarithm of the market share of a regimen in a quarter minus 
the logarithm of the market share of the outside option.  The price variable measures the price that 
physician clinics paid, on average, to wholesalers for a regimen in a quarter.  The regressions 
include a full set of quarter indicator variables.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-
percent level; * = significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level.Table 5
Coefficient       Standard Error
log() ~ N(0,) 0.378 0.13
Efficacy measures:
   General survival (months)  0.203 0.071
   Response rate (percentage)  0.376 0.017
   Response rate * second line therapy  0.055 0.036
   Time to progression (months) -1.579 0.118
Grade 3 or 4 side effects:
Diarrhea  0.147 0.024
   Nausea -0.192 0.099
   Abdominal pain  0.203 0.027
   Neutropenia -0.044 0.005
Tablet  0.156 0.115
Constant   5.072 0.272
Observations        208
GMM obj.       2.1499 x 10
-21
Notes: The regressions include a full set of quarter indicator variables.  A
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